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Abstract After the signing of the Rambouillet Agreement, NATO bombing began, where the
citizens of Kosovo are forced to leave their t The March 2004 riots, which began in the northern part of
Mitrovica, after the killing of two Albanian children, led to the burning of some Orthodox churches in
some parts of Kosovo by some protesters. Following this situation, the UN Secretary General, Mr. Kofi
Annan, charged the Norwegian Mr. Kai Eide for a report, which would reflect the situation in
Kosovo.erritory, due to violence from Serbia. This act sent Kosovo to oversee the administration of the
United Nations. UN issues Security Council “Resolution 1244”, placing Kosovo under UN protectorate.
In terms of "de jure", Kosovo remained part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. According to this
Resolution, the UN was responsible for civil administration, while NATO was responsible for the security
of the territory.
It is alleged that the friendly countries that helped Kosovo in 1999 wanted to avoid including the term
"Yugoslavia" in the resolution, but Russia, through its veto power in the Security Council, included this
term in the Resolution. In December 2003, the International Community, through the Special
Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, Mr. Harry Holkeri, sent to Kosovo a document
known as the "Standards for Kosovo". The document contained the main tasks that Kosovo had to
accomplish by 2005 and then initiate the determination of Kosovo's final status. Following this Report, the
Kosovo-Serbia negotiation process and the finalization of Kosovo status were opened. Meanwhile,
Ahhtisar's plan, the special envoy for the status of Kosovo, according to analysts, sent Kosovo towards
independence, on February 17, 2018. Keywords: Rambouillet Agreement, Resolution 1244, International
administration and the role of the SRSG, Kosovo-Serbia negotiations, Mr.Kai Eide's Report on Kosovo,
Declaration of Independence, Kosovo's Independence.
Keywords: Rambouillet Agreement, Resolution 1244, International administration and the role of the
SRSG, Kosovo-Serbia negotiations, Mr.Kai Eide's Report on Kosovo, Declaration of Independence,
Kosovo's Independence.

Entry
In the time of Dardania, before Christ, when the Dardanian Kingdom was thriving, the Illyrian people in
these areas had a state administrative organization, which also took care of the security, welfare and
stability of the neighbors. For this purpose, King Batto fed a military reserve of about 20.000 people to help
the neighbors, in case their security was threatened.
While the fall of the Dardanian Empire and the later periods of the Slavic invasion towards the Illyrian lands,
the history of the Albanians, until the formation of the state, is heavy and bloody.
Since the breaking of the Russo-Turkish war front 1877-78, in the Battle of Marica, in favor of Russia, the
Albanian people in the Balkans have continued to decline. The invasion of the Ottoman Empire in the
Balkans, by the Albanians was followed by many battles and unequal wars, where the Albanians strongly
resisted. The most famous and most glorious period, was that of Skanderbeg, where for 20 years the
Albanians became the “scapegoat”, they did not allow this empire to violate the gates of European
countries.
These sacrifices of the Albanians were not considered at all by the Peace Conferences in Berlin and London
(19th century). The formation of the states in the Balkans took place under the auspices of Russia after its

victory over the Ottoman Empire. The Russian protectorate over the Orthodox in the Balkans, according to
the Turkish-Russian agreement, became politically influential, influencing the independence of the Slavic
states with an Orthodox religious element in order to control them. These states were Serbia, Montenegro,
Greece (although not a Slavic state, the determinant of its independence was the influence of the Orthodox
element), Bulgaria.
It is worth mentioning that according to the Serbian press and historiography of this time, this period marks
the genocidal expulsion of more than 300 thousand Albanians from the Nis Valley. Albanians of the Islamic
faith were oriented to Turkey, where according to Slavic Orthodox, those with Islamic religious education
were to be expelled from their homes to Turkey. While the Orthodox Albanians, according to the religious
principle, had to accept the Serbian language and their education was allowed and controlled by the
Orthodox Church. The church was run by the state, where the agitation center was located in Russia. It was
the same with the Albanians of the Orthodox faith in Greece. The Greek language and the Greek Orthodox
religious teaching were decisive for the assimilation of the Orthodox Albanians in Greece.
While the Catholic preaching and teaching through Latin was also permitted. Found ghettoized, in these
three religious’ ramifications, millions of Albanians, violently, under fire and bayonets, persecuted by their
newly arrived neighbors, were displaced from their homes. Albanians were only Albanians, they were not
Greeks, they were not Turkish-Arabs or Serbo-Slavs. The Albanian language was not allowed neither in
churches and mosques, nor in schools. By secret and open agreements, the new states cleared the territory,
washing it with Albanian blood and where there had never been Serbia and Greece, Bulgaria and
Montenegro under the influence of Russia and in reconciliation with the Bosphorus smur, Illyrian – Albanian
lands were partitioned and divided. This tragedy was repeated at the end of the twentieth century (‘98’99),
in the Kosovo War, but now in completely new circumstances. The tactic of scorched earth, cleansing of the
territory and genocide, again weighed on the heads of this people, from Slavic orthodoxy again with the
‘amen” of Russia. During this war also, the Joint Declaration of the Serbia-Russia-Belarusia, Russia union was
signed again. So with the same mentality and action of the last century XVIIII and XIX, but with a different
packaging tactic. Every fighter who left in war in Kosovo was preferred to be blessed in the Church, to kill,
massacre, rape and humiliate as many innocent citizens as possible. Deep in history are the bloody roots of
the beginning of the state formation of Kosovo, historical turning point occurred in the Kosovo War, during
the years 98 and 99. From this time, in the continuation of the article we will address some spicy aspects of
the state formation of Kosovo until our days.

Rambouillet Agreement
The Rambouillet conference marks one of the most important events in the recent history Kosovo. For the
first time the issue of Kosovo was internationalized, and as a result did not lose its importance. The
development of events in Kosovo helped the international community of understand the true nature of the
conflict in Kosovo: “The fact that Albanians are not terrorists, but victims of Serbian aggression and wage a
self-defense and liberation war”. From 6 to 24 February 1999 in Rambouillet, France and from 15 to 18
March 1999 in Paris, at the initiative of the international community, a conference was organized, aimed at
reaching a peaceful agreement between Serbs and Albanians for Kosovo.
The Conference approved the Agreement, which sanctioned the ending of violence in Kosovo, free and
democratic elections under the UN supervision, the resolution of problems through dialogue, the
preservations of the sovereignty and integrity of the remaining Yugoslavia, the substantial self-government
of Kosovo, the protection of rights of all national communities in Kosovo, a three – year period for resolving
the final status of the Kosovo issue and international participation of the United Nations in the
implementation of the Agreement. The Yugoslav delegation, led by Serbian Prime Minister M. Milutinovic,
refused to sign the agreement.
The agreement left the way open for a transition from substantial self-government to Kosovo’s
independence. The Serbian side realized that Kosovo was slipping out of its hands and moving towards
independence.

To counter such a circumstance, Serbian President S. Milosevic agrees to face NATO bombing. Through this
action, he incited the feelings of nationalization of the Serbian people, considering the confrontation with
NATO as a nationalist resistance. Meanwhile, more than that for S. Milosevic, this case was more suitable
for the complete ethnic cleansing of Albanians. To stop the military and state violence against the Albanians,
on March 24, 1999, the NATO bombing of Kosovo began, which continued for 78 days. On June 12, 1999,
Serbian troops withdrew from Kosovo and NATO forces were welcomed as liberators of Kosovo.
The purpose of the conference was to provide a political solution to the conflict or, as the document itself
suggest, an interim agreement on peace and self-government in Kosovo. The mechanism for a final
settlement of the Kosovo issue included in this document predicted that 3 years after entering into force of
the agreement, an international meeting will be held, to determine a mechanism for final solution for the
Kosovo issue based on the will of the people of the relevant authorities, the efforts of each party regarding
implementation of the agreement, and the Helsinki Final Act.
Instead, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, in a letter sent to the Kosovo delegation “inter alia”, says
that we consider this proposal as a confirmation of the right of the people of Kosovo to have a referendum
for the final status of Kosovo after three years.
On March 18, 1999, the Agreement was signed by Albanian representatives, but not by their Serbian
counterparts. It was highlighted that this agreement was concluded und the auspices of the members of the
Contact Group and the European Union, taking into account the connection of these to respect this
agreement.
Also, as well as the fact sheet document, issued March 18, 1999 by the Bureau of European Affairs, US
Departments of State, Washington D.C suggests that the Rambouillet Agreement Accords provide a three (3)
year interim agreement that would ensure democratic self-government, peace and security for all those
living in Kosovo.
The agreement stipulates that the final settlement of Kosovo’s status will be determined based on the will
of the people of Kosovo. Despite the fact that this agreement was not signed by Serbia, Security Council,
Resolution 1244 referred to it. The relevant part of Annex I of the resolution, listing a number of general
principles for the political solution of the Kosovo crisis, adopted at the G8 Foreign Ministers’ meeting, held
at the Peterberg Center on May 6, 1999, states that: A political process towards the establishment a
framework of the Interim Political Agreement, which ensures considerable self-government for Kosovo,
taking into account the Rambouillet Agreement, and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and other Countries in the region, including the demilitarization of the
“KLA”. This point, the point 6 of Annex I of the Resolution 1244, respectively the point 7 of Annex 2 of this
resolution is still in the text, which on June 3 have accepted the Rambouillet Agreement. NATO military
intervention is made to accept the Rambouillet Agreement, in its Chapter – 7 – Annexes – Annex B: Status of
multinational implementing forces, point 8 guarantees that: “NATO personnel, will have together with its
vehicles, aircraft carriers and vehicles, free unrestricted movement and unhindered entry throughout the
FRY, including its airspace and territorial waters”.

Resolution 1244
Resolution 1244, adopted on 10 June 99 by the Security Council, in its 4011th meeting. In support of the
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, as well as the primary responsibility of the
Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. Recalling Resolutions 1160 (1998)
of 31 March, 1199 (1998) of 23 September 1998, 1230 (1998) of 24 October 1998 and 1239 (1999) of 14 May
1999. In regret that the resolution demands have not been fully implemented, determined to resolve the
grater humanitarian situation in Kosovo, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to ensure the free and safe
return of all refugees and displaced persons from their homes. Condemning acts of violence against the
people of Kosovo, as well as all acts of terrorism by any party. Recalling the Secretary – General’s
Declaration of 9 April 1999, in which he expresses concern about the humanitarian tragedy taking place in
Kosovo.

Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in safety. Recalling the
jurisdiction and mandate of the International Court of Justice for the former Yugoslavia. Welcoming the
general principles for a political solution to the Kosovo crisis, adopted on 6 may 1999 (S/1999/156, annex 1
of this resolution) and also welcoming the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles
set out in point 1 to 9, of the document submitted to Belgrade on 2 June 1999 (S/1999/156, annex 1 to this
resolution), as well as the FRY’s consent to that document.
Reaffirming the commitment of all member states for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY and
other states in the region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and Annex II. Reaffirming the referral in
previous resolutions for substantive autonomy and meaningful self-government for Kosovo. Determining
that the situation in the region continues to pose a threat to international peace and security, determined to
ensure the safety of international personnel and the implementation by all parties involved – of their
responsibilities under this resolution and acting for these purposes according to Chapter VII of the Charter of
the United Nations:
“Decides that the political solution to the Kosovo crisis to be based on the general principles set out in Annex
I and as further elaborated on the other principles and elements required in Annex II”.
The acceptance by the FRY of the principles and other elements required in the above Annex requires the
full cooperation of the FRY for their prompt implementation.
It requires in particular for the FRY to end immediately and verifiably, in stages, the military, police and
paramilitary forces, on the basis of a set schedule, with which will synchronize the establishment of the
international security presence in Kosovo.
The resolution requires the Secretary-General to appoint, in consultation with the Security Council, a Special
Representative to oversee the implementation of the civilian presence, and further requests that the
Secretary-General will instruct his Special Representative to co-operate closely with the international
security presence in order to ensure that both parties will act for the same goals and support each other
mutually.
The resolution authorizes the Secretary-General with the assistance of other relevant international
organizations, to establish an international civilian presence in Kosovo, in order to establish an interim
administration for Kosovo, under which the people of Kosovo may enjoy substantial autonomy, within the
FRY, and which will ensure the transitional administration as it establishes and oversees the development of
interim democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a normal and peaceful life for all the
inhabitants of Kosovo.

International Administration and the role of the SRSG
The international administration in Kosovo, defined by Resolution 1244, was of a temporary nature and
aims to create appropriate democratic conditions for the resolution of Kosovo’s final status. This model is
specific to the fact that, because equivalent to eliminating the causes of the crisis and interethnic hostilities,
to solve the source of the crisis and enable a long-term political and status solution to the crisis. The
resolution promotes the concept of self-government for Kosovo, substantial state powers are reserved and
exercised by the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which is the final
authority in the functioning of Kosovo’s government, in its three forms: legislative, executive and judicial.
The international presence would be “controlled” by a special representative of the UN Secretary-General.
Whereas the military presence established by member states and international organizations, would
coordinate closely with civilian presence, but would not be under the control of the UN Secretary-General.
During the first phase of international rule, by the UN Special Representative (SRSG), Bernard
Kouchner Kosovar actors mainly had the power of consultation. However, relatively quickly, the second
phase began, which in 2000 created the joint temporary administrative structure. It consisted of twenty
departments with responsibilities for civil administration. These departments were headed jointly by a

foreign and a local official. Added to this was the holding of municipal elections and the establishment of
local self-governments by the end of 2000 (or 2001 to be exact). The third phase provided conditioned selfgovernment, which was to be fulfilled under the terms of the Constitutional Framework, which was adopted
in 2001.
The SRSG reserved the general right to supervise the Interim Institutions and its officials, and to take the
necessary measures whenever their actions were in conflict with Resolution 1244 or the Constitutional
Framework.
The unique character of the SRSG’s role was also significant for the fact that he could “make” changes to the
Constitutional Framework, either by a two-thirds majority of the Assembly, or at his own discretion. This
provision raised doubts about the character of the instrument as a “constitution” and instead confirmed its
“sui generis” character.
The Assembly of Kosovo, the main legislative body of the Interim Self-Government, consists of 120 members
elected by secret ballot, with a single Kosovo constituency. One hundred seats were divided proportionally,
based on votes for parties and independent initiatives.
In should be added that twenty seats were reserved “for the additional representation of Kosovo non –
Albanian communities”. Ten of them belonged to those who claim to be representative of the Serb-Kosovo
community, the other seats were divided between the communities of: Romans, Ashkali, Egyptians,
Bosnians, Turkish and Gorans.
The constitutional framework functioned relatively efficiently. However, it could not go beyond two
structural aspects. The first was the inefficiency of the international administration, even though a lot of
resources had been poured into it, it failed to control the major infrastructure issues that continued to
plague Kosovo over the years. It was a little more successful in its attempt to build real governance
institutions. This was not the merit of its capacity building programs that had to focus on new and different
issues each year, but rather the will of the parties and local actors taking over the administrative functions,
which resulted in the establishment of a relatively well-developed administrative system, at the time of
independence, in the early 2008.
The other problematic issue had to do with ethnic relations. The Serb community in the territory maintained
its ties with Belgrade and the Serbs were ghettoized by Belgrade’s influence. They often failed to become
part of Kosovar institutions, and to participate in elections. This was mostly observed in territorially
compact areas, mostly inhabited by ethnic Serbs, especially in North Mitrovica.

The March riots
On March 17, 2004, the riots that later became known as the “March Riots” began. The riots lasted for two
days, killing 19 civilians, 11 of them were Albanians and 8 Serbs, while injuring over 900 people, mostly
Albanians.
During these riots, which erupted throughout Kosovo after reports that two children had been killed in Ibar
as a result of Serbian violence, but the cause of this tragedy was never fully clarified. As a result, many Serb
houses and places of worship were burned, which were rebuilt with Kosovo budget funds.
Some children who survived later that night in front of the cameras confessed how they were chased by
Serbs and that they were fleeing when their compatriots drowned in the river. The next day, March 17,
protests began in many cities in Kosovo, where they quickly escalated into violence.
Several Serb houses and churches were burned during the riots. Something similar happened to Albanian
home in Serb-majority areas. Serbs, as they did during the war with the state guidance, retaliate by burning
some non-Albanian mosques in Serbia. Of the 19 people killed in the riots, 12 were Albanians.

The special diplomatic mission in Kosovo, UNMIK, in order not to ignite the situation did not tell the truth
about what had happened. Serbs used the opportunity to block the aspirations of Kosovar politicians for a
Kosovo with a multiethnic society.
These riots woke up many decision-makers, where everyone realized that in Kosovo, the situation cannot be
improved without resolving the final status. The Secretary – General of the United Nations, Mr. Kofi Annan
instructed the Norwegian, Mr. Kai Eide, to draft a report that would reflect the situation in Kosovo and the
Balkans, where he met with the representatives of all political entities, communities and religions. In
October 2005, the report requested by the Security Council was submitted.
Although this repot highlighted many things that could be improved, it is recommended that the time has
come to start negotiations on Kosovo’s final status. A few days later, Mr. Kofi Annan made the same
recommendation to the United Nations Security Council.
On February 17, 2008, based on this proposal, Kosovo was declared an independent and sovereign state.
The Constitution of Kosovo, which gives all competencies of the state, enters into force on June 15, 2008.

Mr.Kai Eide's Report on Kosovo
Based on the report of the Interim Mission of the Administration of Kosovo UNMIK, dated May 23, 2005, it
requested a comprehensive review of the situation in Kosovo. The review dealt with the particular
consideration as to whether the conditions for initiating and carrying out the future status process were
met.
The UN Secretary General consulted with the governments of the Quint, the OSCE and NATO on this
initiative, before coming out with his recommendations, with the Eides report.
However, these initial recommendations focused on strengthening UNMIK’s capacity and the responsibility
of Kosovo’s local institutions, not just the potential status process. He added, however, that “progress in all
these aspects is essential to the success and sustainability of any future status process, and only if progress is
sufficient it will be possible to move gradually towards negotiations on the future status of Kosovo”.
On October 7, 2005, Eide’s ambassador reported to the Security Council that the fulfillment of different
standards where not the same (one of a kind) but, nevertheless, the time had come to move towards status.
Ambassador Eide added: “The process for the future status must be started carefully. All parties must gather
and stay together throughout the status process. The end result should be stable and consistent”. No
artificial deadlines should be set. “Once the process starts, it cannot be blocked, but it must be completed”.
This remark was ultimately key to building the status quo process. It seemed inevitable that the final status
would lead to some form of independence or some camouflaged independence of Kosovo. This result,
however, would be hardly acceptable to Belgrade. Therefore, the conviction was very clear from the
beginning that the final solution could not be “blocked” if it was to be reached.
Therefore, a process should be built that would offer everyone a chance for an agreement, but in the end,
would lead to a solution in the absence of Serbia’s consent.
On October 24, the Security Council authorized the start of the status process. The council strongly urged the
Kosovo leadership to step up its efforts to implement the standards. However, the policy of “standards
before status” had now lost credibility, and therefore gave another argument that Kosovo would like to
adhere to certain standards, in it possible and future efforts to seek Euro-Atlantic integration.
The Council endorsed the Secretary-General’s opinion to launch a political process to determine Kosovo’s
future status, as provided for in Resolution 1244 (1999). Affirming the framework of the Resolution, the
Council welcomed and encouraged the Contact Group, consisting of France, Germany, Italy, the Russian
Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, to be closely involved in the political process, “to
lead from the UN and to support the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the future”.

In line with the Security Council, the Secretary – General appointed Martti Ahtisaari, the former President of
Finland, who assisted in the final negotiation of NATO’s campaign against Yugoslavia as Special Envoy for
the Kosovo final status process.

Negotiations of Kosovo and Serbia
The Secretary-General appointed Mr.Ahtisaari as special envoy in November 2005 to the UN Security
Council Resolution 1244 (1999) on the future status process. His mandate had to be carried out in
accordance with the ten guiding principles adopted by the Contact Group. In a statement issued by the
Ministers of the Contact Group on 31 January 2006, it was stated that they expected Belgrade to take into
account that the solution, among other things, should be acceptable to the people of Kosovo, and that the
catastrophic policies of the past extend to the essence of current problems.
After fifteen months of UN- sponsored negotiations, Mr.Ahtisaari prepared a Comprehensive Proposal for
the Kosovo Status Settlement, where he recommended that Kosovo’s status be “supervised independence”.
The Special Envoy reported to the Secretary-General in 2007 (in the Ahtisaari Report) although he and his
team “held intensive negotiations with the leaders of Serbia and Kosovo over the past years” to reach an
agreement. Political solution that determines the future status of Kosovo”, it became clear…. that the
parties are not able to reach an agreement on the future status of Kosovo.
The Special Envoy reported that: “Both sides have reaffirmed their categorical, diametrically opposed
positions”, stating that: “It is my strong view that the potential of the negotiations to produce a mutually
acceptable outcome on the status of Kosovo”, is exhausted “No number of additional talks, regardless of
format, will be able to overcome this deadlock”.
Noting that “the state of limbo of Kosovo cannot continue” as “the uncertainty over its future status is a
major obstacle to Kosovo’s democratic development, accountability, economic recovery and interethnic
reconciliation”, the special envoy concluded that: “The time has come to resolve the final status of Kosovo”.
Accordingly, he concluded as follows: “After careful consideration of Kosovo’s recent history, the reality of
Kosovo today and given the negotiations with the parties, I have come to the conclusion that the only
possible option for Kosovo it is independence for an initial period under the supervision of the international
community”. Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Final Status Settlement, which provided international
oversight structures that secures the foundations for an independent Kosovo, capable of success,
sustainability and stability, and in which all communities and their members can live a peaceful and
dignified existence.
After this period of discussion in the Security Council, the Contact Group (France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the
United Kingdom and the United States of America) proposed that a “troika” of representatives from the EU,
the United States and Russia undertake another period of negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina on
the future status of Kosovo: “The last major issue concerning the fall of Yugoslavia”. On 1 August 2007, the
UN Secretary – General welcomed the initiative, reaffirming his belief that the “status quo” was unstable
and requested that a report to be submitted by the Contact Group on these efforts by 10 December 2007.
Although “the most direct, sustained and intensive high-level dialogue since the end of hostilities in Kosovo
in “99”, Troika representatives reported that: “The parties did not agree on a status agreement of Kosovo”.

Comprehensive Proposal for Kosovo Status Resolution
(Ahtisaari Package)
The Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, also known as the “Ahtisaari Package”, on
March 2, 2007, was submitted to both parties (Kosovo-Serbia) in talks by the UN Secretary-General’s Special
Envoy for the Kosovo status process, Martii Ahtisaari (diplomat and negotiator with international
experience). On March 26, 2007, the UN Secretary – General sent to the UN Security Council the final version
of the Comprehensive Proposal and the recommendation on the status of Kosovo, which considered that

the only possible option was the independence of Kosovo, which for an initial period it would be overseen
by the international community.
To reach this proposal during 2006, in Vienna, 15 rounds (sessions) of talks were held between the
delegations of Kosovo and Serbia, which were led by Mr.Ahtisaari and Mr.Rohan, including the meetings
between senior state officials of Kosovo and Serbia, held on July 24, 2006. Additional talks continued during
2007 in Vienna. The mediators were supported by the UN Office created specifically for these talks, named
UNOSEK.
The talks covered a range of issues, mainly on decentralization (more than half of the meetings) and cultural
heritage, while other issues were discussed less (eg on community rights was discussed two (2) times, while
on economics only one time).
While the Kosovo delegation was quite cooperative and ready to seriously consider the issues raised in the
talks, accepting a series of compromises, on the other hand the Serbian delegation showed no sign of
cooperation and tried to win in time and sabotage the talks.
So, Kosovo made a series of concessions, especially in the area of decentralization – the creation of five (5)
new Serb – majority municipalities: Gracanca, Kllokot, Partesh, Ranillug and North Mitrovica, as well as the
significant expansion of the territory of the municipality of Novo Brdo, giving them increased competencies
in terms of education (the use of Serbian curricula and textbooks in schools with teaching in Serbian and the
University of Mitrovica with teaching in Serbian) cooperation with municipalities and institutions of the
Republic of Serbia, health care, cultural heritage (protected areas for Orthodox churches and monasteries
and the security sector, respectively police), this significantly exceeding their provisions of the European
Chatter of Local Self – Government, the rights of communities (provision of special rights, in certain areas,
based on the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities).
The Assembly of Kosovo, on April 5, 2007, adopted the Declaration on the Status of Kosovo, which supports
the Comprehensive Proposal. Whereas, the Assembly of Serbia, through the resolution, rejects it.
Meanwhile, due to open objections, in the first place of Russia, which warned that it will veto, where the
draft resolution in support of the Comprehensive Proposal was not presented at all for a vote in the Security
Council. To unlock this whole situation at the G-8th meeting in Heiligendamm (Germany), held on 6-8 June
2007, the President of France, Mr.Nicolas Sarkkozy proposed additional talks, with a fixed deadline (120
days), and if even after this period there was no agreement between the parties, then the Security Council
would support the Comprehensive Proposal. This proposal was rejected, as was the other softer draft
resolution, which consisted of the possibility of additional talks within a 120 – day period and which,
regardless of their outcome after that period, would be replaced by an appointed UNMIK International
civilian Representative from the EU, which would lead the European mission for security and protection and
rule of law in Kosovo.
However, the initiative for additional talks was supported and in this context the Contact Group appointed
the Troika of Negotiators in this composition: Wolfgang Ischinger from Germany as representative of the
European Union, Frank Wiesner from the United States of America and from Russia Alexander Botsan –
Harchenko.
The UN Secretary-General welcomed the initiative and requested a report from the troika by 10 December
2007 (after additional talks). As expected, this additional period of negotiations did not bring any news, as in
fact both sides remained in their positions.

Kosovo Declaration of Independence
Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence, 17 February 2008, states that Kosovo is “a special case of the nonconsensual dissolution of Yugoslavia and that it is not a precedent for any other situation”. In essence, “We,
the leaders of our people, in full compliance with the recommendations of the United Nations Special Envoy,
Martti Ahtisaari, and his Comprehensive Proposals for resolving the status of Kosovo”.

We declare Kosovo a democratic, secular and multi-ethnic republic guided by the principles of non –
discrimination and equal protection under the law. We will protect and promote the right of all
communities in Kosovo and create the necessary conditions for their effective participation in political and
decision-marking processes.
“We hereby affirm in a clear, specific and irrevocable manner that Kosovo will be legally obliged to comply
with the provisions contained in this declaration, including in particular its obligations under the Ahtisaari
Plan. In all these matters, we will act in accordance with the principles of international law and the
resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, including Resolution 1244 (1999). “We publicly declare
that all states have the right to rely on this statement and we appeal to them to offer their support and
encouragement”
The declaration was adopted unanimously by 109 votes, including those of all non-Serb minorities. Ten
representatives of the Serb community and one member of the Goran community boycotted the 120 –
member Assembly.
The declaration was drafted in collaboration with key governments that controlled its content. It was
formed in a way that it had important legal implications for Kosovo. Using the important international
notion of “unilateral declaration”, it created “egra omnes” legal obligations. These are legal obligations that
can be requested to be acted upon. In this sense, an attempt was made to replace the binding character of
the Security Council Resolution deriving from Chapter VII, by imposing on itself the limitations of Kosovo’s
sovereignty, according to the Ahtissari Plan. Given that Kosovo had not yet adopted its Constitution,
according to the plan at the time of the declaration of Independence, this fact was of the particular
importance.
The Serbian Parliament quickly adopted a decision seeking to annul the statement. Serbia and the Russian
Federation also immediately protested at the international level, demanding an urgent Security Council
meeting to discuss the Kosovo issue publicly. This meeting was opened by the UN Secretary General, who
informed the meeting that the Assembly of Kosovo in fact, had UN Secretary General stressed that: “The
Declaration confirmed that Kosovo fully accepted the obligations arising from the Comprehensive Proposal
for the settlement and the continued observance of Resolution 1244”.

Kosovo independence
In the 9th year, under the UN-led transitional administration and after a series of unsuccessfully
internationally mediated talks, convened in an extraordinary meeting of February 17, 2008, the
democratically elected representatives of the people of Kosovo declared “Kosovo an independent and
sovereign state”, noting that this act reflects the will of our people and is in full compliance with the
recommendations of the UN special envoy, Martti Ahtisaari, and his Comprehensive Proposal for a
Settlement of the status of Kosovo”. Serbia raised the issue with the ICJ to attack “Kosovo’s independence as
illegal in terms of international law”. In this regard, an advisory opinion was sought from the International
Court of Justice, from the UN General Assembly, on the issue of the legality of the Declaration of
Independence of Kosovo. The Court issued its advisory opinion on 22 July 2010, stating that, The
International Court of Justice has concluded that: “The approval of the declaration of independence on 17
February 2008 did not violate any applicable rule of international law”.

CONCLUSIONS
During this topic, was highlighted a journey of many efforts, sacrifice, patience and cooperation of the
people of Kosovo led by its leadership and the UNMIK administration, until the declaration of Kosovo’s
Independence in coordination with the international factor.
Immediately after the deployment of the security forces - KFOR in Kosovo, the international protectorate of
UNMIKs civil mission was established, where the priority goal was the reconstruction, security and
preparation of the country for democracy and free elections.

Knowing that the country could not return to the past – to the administration of Belgrade, the international
factor under the auspices of the US, until the declaration of independence organized a protracted
negotiation process.
The negotiation process was led by the UN and EU Commissioner, Martti Ahtissari, who, in addition to
organizing the negotiation process, also “formalized” the Constitutional Framework of the state of Kosovo,
establishing additional rights for the Serb minority in the Constitution of Kosovo, otherwise known as the
“Ahtiasar Package”.
Throughout the negotiation process, the Serbian side was always rejecting the process, for which as
finalized, to not result with the right of the self-determination of the People of Kosovo. But, the beginning of
the negotiations, had a basic principle, where it was stated that “no solution can be imposed on the people
of Kosovo, and the final solution (negotiations) must be completed in accordance with the will of the people
of Kosovo. In this way Ahtisaari prepared the Report for the Secretary General with the final proposal that
Kosovo could declare its Independence which for a short time would be overseen by the international
factor. The Serbian side rejected this proposal.
At the initiative of France, an additional deadline (120 days) of negotiations was requested, which, after a
failure, was nevertheless accepted by the Contact Group and these negotiations would be led by the USGermany-Russia trio. Germany represented the EU.
This additional deadline, which took place during 2007, did not bring anything new, because Serbia was
always reluctant and the parties remain in their previous positions. Following the UN troika report, the
green light was given that Kosovo, in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter on Human Rights and
Freedoms, could lead Kosovo to internationally supervised state-building.
2008 (February 17) brought the Declaration of Independence, which was rejected by Serbia and Russia,
where Serbia filed a complaint with the International Tribunal for Justice, and an Opinion from this Tribunal
was requested by the UN Secretary General, to ensure compliance this Declaration with International Law.
The Court’s opinion of 2010, clarified that “Kosovo’s independence is not in contrary to the international
law”.
We consider that the technical talks, held with Serbia, after the conclusion of the state formation of Kosovo
and the positive confirmation of the ICJ, were unprepared, and from a technical process slipped into a
political process, which brought Kosovo great damage and stifled the strengthening of our international
subjectivity. Where Serbia was favored in this direction, even successfully used this process in undermining
previous state-building processes, causing damage to the diplomatic, security and economic plans of
Kosovo. All future talks must not prevail the sovereignty, integrity and acts already confirmed
internationally, because they bring irreparable damage to the future of Kosovo and the Region.
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Abstract Being aware of the epochal developments of Information Technology and
Communication, as well as the irreplaceable role in all areas of life and the new challenges that
digitalization has brought during its use, our project will clarify the legal rules, ethical and
challenges during application use in Kosovo.
While we are having our time off, lunchtime, sleep time or we disconnect from information
network for some moments, we see that with the clicks we are making in our computer machine,
we stumble in a lot of new information. But in the ICT field, we are full of information about
hundreds of new software programs and applications..., which make work easier for us in these
services e.g. banking, health care system, education, administration, production, etc. All these
goods come as a result of the epochal development of digitalization. Large data collection; "BIG
DATA", "ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE", "COMMUNICATION NETWORKS", "eGOVERNANCE" and "INTERNET", is a necessity, almost insurmountable in support of our
work be they services; operational, educational, administrative... or scientific research.
Whereas, the coherence of the implementation of international, constitutional, and ethical rules
regarding the dignity of the individual, fundamental rights, privacy and security of personal
data, leave much to be desired because their violation is the concern of the new democratic
society. Understanding of Information Security, Information systems, Big Data, Legal-Ethical
Rules, and Violation of the individual’s data, are the focus of the following topic.

Keywords: Information Systems Security, Legal-Ethical Rules and Challenges of Violation
of the personal data.

